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Chapter 1
 Introduction:
Biotechnology, Risk Regulation, and Transatlantic Discord
In 1992, the United States (US) Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved
the first genetically engineered food – Calgene’s Flavr Savr Tomato – for sale and
marketing in the United States.  Encouraged by a favorable US regulatory system and the
lack of serious domestic political challenge, US scientists have subsequently created,
farmers have grown, and companies have marketed a wide range of genetically modified
(GM) foods and crops.  By the end of the 1990s, in “the most rapid adoption of a new
technology in the history of agriculture,” some sixty percent of processed foods available
in US groceries were derived from genetically modified organisms (GMOs).1 By the end
of 2003, the estimate had risen to “between 70 and 75 percent of all processed foods
available in US grocery stores.”2 By 2007, approximately 89% of soybeans, 83% of
cotton, and 61% of corn grown in the United States consisted of genetically modified
varieties, and these figures were rising annually.3 US farmers also grow genetically
engineered canola, potatoes, tomatoes, papaya, squash and sunflowers, among other
foods, although to much lesser degrees.4
By contrast with the US embrace of agricultural biotechnology, European Union
(EU)5 regulators and publics have taken a far more cautious approach to GMOs, treating
genetically  modified  (GM)  foods  and  crops  as  different  from  their  conventional
                                                            
1 Hill and Battle 2000.  European laws use the term “genetically modified organisms,” or foods or crops,
while United States (US) regulatory authorities tend to refer to “bioengineered” or “genetically engineered
organisms,” or foods or crops. We use these terms interchangeably. When we use the more common term
“genetically modified” (GM) food, it should be clear that we are speaking of genetic engineering and not
conventional modification through the cross-breeding of plants.
2 Bren 2003. Hill and Battle, in contrast, reported a figure of 60% of processed foods in 1999. Hill and
Battle 2000: 5.
3 APHIS 2007: 1.
4 Vogt 2005.
5 The terms EU and EC (European Community) are used interchangeably in this book. The Treaty of
European Union of 1992 created three separate “pillars” of activities for the regional block: the traditional
EC one, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Justice and Home Affairs. The first (EC) pillar
covers the regulation of agricultural biotechnology. The term which encompasses all three pillars is the
European Union (or EU), which is most frequently used by commentators.6
counterparts, and adopting increasingly strict and complex regulatory procedures for their
approval  and  marketing.  Unlike  in  the  United  States,  GM  foods  and  crops  face
considerable regulatory hurdles in the EU, including requirements for mandatory pre-
approval of all GM products, as well as provisions on the mandatory labeling and
traceability of all GM products, which have made it difficult and sometimes impossible
for US farmers to export genetically modified foods to markets in Europe.
In an age of increasing international trade and economic interdependence, these
sharp and persistent regulatory differences have resulted in an ongoing transatlantic
dispute where economic interests and social values clash, what some political scientists
have called “system friction.”6   By the late 1990s, stricter European regulations and
slower European regulatory approval processes for new GM varieties raised potentially
serious obstacles to the export of agricultural products from the United States. A potential
international trade war loomed.
Throughout the past decade, US and EU representatives have alternatively and
concurrently dueled and tried to manage the conflict over their respective approaches to
biotechnology regulation. They have formed numerous bilateral networks of government
officials, scientists and civil society representatives to engage in extensive bilateral
consultations. They have also discussed and negotiated the issues in multiple multilateral
contexts, such as before the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD),  the  international  food  standard  setting  body,  the  Codex  Alimentarius
Commission; the international trade body, the World Trade Organization (WTO); and an
international environmental body, the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on
Biodiversity, which has resulted in a new Biosafety Protocol.  Despite these efforts, the
two sides have not fundamentally modified their divergent regulatory approaches and
decisions, although there have been changes as we will see. After considerable internal
debate and delay, the Bush Administration finally filed a legal complaint before the WTO
in May 2003, maintaining that the EU’s regulatory decisions over GM crops and foods
violated the EU’s international trading commitments, which finally resulted in a panel
decision issued in September 2006.
                                                            
6 Kahler 1995.7
Today, the transatlantic dispute over the regulation of agricultural biotechnology
has become a global one, illuminating the challenges faced when national diversity meets
economic interdependence. Most contemporary regulation remains nation-based or, in the
case of the European Union, a nation/region-based hybrid. Yet the market for food and
for innovations in biotechnology is increasingly global, and companies pursue global
strategies. Thinking about regulation only in terms of autonomous national jurisdictions,
therefore, is increasingly inaccurate and inappropriate. National regulatory systems do
not exist in isolation. They respond to developments beyond national boundaries that
have internal effects, and their decisions have external effects over those who have no say
in their determination. When conflicts arise among different regulatory jurisdictions, like
the United States and the EU, there is no centralized global governmental structure
present to impose discipline. Facing such potential and actual conflicts, both states and
non-state  actors  have  fostered  the  development  of  international  regimes,
transgovernmental networks of regulators and transnational networks of scientists and
activists.  Many analysts maintain that it is through a combination of these decentralized
networks  and  pluralistic  international  regimes  that  cooperation  can  be  facilitated,
deliberation promoted, and conflict diffused.  Agricultural biotechnology thus presents
the world with a challenge:   In an age of global markets, agricultural biotechnology
cannot be regulated purely at the domestic level, yet it is unclear how, or even whether,
regulation can take place at the global level when states disagree.
In this book we investigate these challenges – regulating risk in a global economy
– through the prism of the United States (US)-European dispute over the regulation of
agricultural biotechnology, or, as more popularly known, genetically modified organisms
(GMOs).7 The book addresses the interaction of domestic law and politics, transnational
networks, international regimes, and global markets in this area. It starts by examining
the US and European regulatory differences that gave rise to the conflict, examining the
sources of the differences and their impact on the prospects for regulatory convergence or
accommodation. It shows how conflicts arise when national regulations become barriers
                                                            
7 European laws use the term “genetically modified organisms,” or foods or crops, while United States
(US) regulatory authorities tend to refer to “bioengineered” or “genetically engineered organisms,” or foods
or crops. We use these terms interchangeably. When we use the more common term “genetically modified”
food, it should be clear that we are speaking of genetic engineering and not conventional modification
through the cross-breeding of plants.8
to international trade, and how they can become particularly bitter and intractable when,
as in the case of GMOs, they concern the regulation of risk to society. It then addresses
attempts to reconcile these differences through transnational networks and multilateral
institutions – which have, as we shall see, enjoyed a record of at best mixed success over
the past several decades.  The US/EU dispute, and whether it can be resolved through
deliberative networks or international regimes, matters profoundly, we argue, not just for
those countries but for the rest of the world, whose regulation of genetically modified
(GM) foods and crops is likely to be influenced by the outcome of the transatlantic
conflict.
In  analyzing  the  ongoing  struggle  over  the  regulation  of  agricultural
biotechnology, we draw upon, and seek to contribute to, rich literatures on politics and
law, at both the domestic and international levels.  At the domestic level, we ask why the
US and EU systems for the regulation of GM foods and crops look as different as they
do, and we survey theories of comparative politics that attribute differences in domestic
regulation to differences in organized interests, political institutions, culture and ideas,
and contingent events, respectively.   We also ask about the development of the two
regulatory systems over time, drawing on the historical institutionalist literature to
understand the conditions under which different regulatory systems are subject to inertia
or path-dependence, resisting pressures for change or displaying change only at the
margins.  We argue that the current “regulatory polarization” between the United States
and the European Union cannot be traced to any single factor, but reflects the efforts of
domestic interest groups advocating their preferences in specific institutional and cultural
contexts, with a significant role played by contingent events on each side.  The adoption
of starkly different regulatory systems on each side of the Atlantic was not inevitable, we
argue, but once these systems were in place, their subsequent development has been
incremental, marginal, and path-dependent.
At the international level, we draw upon a growing body of international relations
and international legal scholarship that focuses on the promise of regulation through
networks and/or international regimes, with a particular emphasis on the prospect of
“deliberation” as a new form of decision-making in which governmental and non-
governmental actors engage in a collective search for truth and for the best policy.  A9
growing amount of scholarship has also addressed the roles of so-called “soft” law
(which  is  formally  non-binding)  and  “hard”  law  (which  is  formally  binding  and
enforceable) as complementary (and sometimes evolutionary) means for international
problem-solving. We address both the prospects and the limits to these approaches, using
the GMO dispute as a vehicle. As we will see, a wealth of transnational governmental,
scientific, business, and civil society networks have arisen, complementing multiple
international regimes that govern aspects of the regulation of GMOs. Yet this growth of
international law, networks and institutions has not necessarily led to deliberation,
conflict reduction, and regulatory convergence.   Transnational and transgovernmental
networks have attempted to engage in collective deliberation, we demonstrate, but such
deliberation  has  been  frustrated  in  practice  by  the  existence  of  sharply  different
regulatory views and traditions, by the intense politicization of the issue in domestic
politics,  and  by  the  existence  of  distributive  conflicts  between  the  two  sides.
Furthermore, the international regimes established to deal with different aspects of GMO
regulation can conflict and affect each other’s operations, and various actors with starkly
different  views  can  “forum  shop”  among  regimes,  attempting  to  harness  them
strategically to advance their particular goals. Our study shows, for example, how “soft”
law regimes can become constrained and stalemated by distributional conflicts, and
“hard” law regimes (such as that of the World Trade Organization, WTO) become
softened and less certain, when they simultaneously confront a single policy dispute. The
result can be the continuation of underlying conflict which simply manifests itself in
different venues. Nonetheless, in the end we show that, despite rather entrenched US and
European  positions,  different  transnational  and  international  factors  have  affected
domestic politics, institutions and decisions, both through market reactions to foreign and
international regulatory rules and practices, and through direct legislative and regulatory
change.
The dangers of generalizing broader conclusions from a single case study are well
known, and we take care throughout the book to acknowledge the aspects of the dispute
that are distinctive to the subject of agricultural biotechnology.  We nonetheless embed
our study and its conclusions in the broader context of theoretical and policy debates over
regulatory conflict, transnational and multilateral governance, and risk regulation for two10
reasons. First, this case is one of major public policy import involving revolutionary
technologies that could bring significant benefits, yet are also considered (by many) to
pose considerable risks.   The transatlantic dispute over agricultural biotechnology
matters, not only farmers and biotech companies that produce GM foods and crops, but
also to each of us, for whom it will help determine the food we eat and the clothes we
wear.8  In order to understand the GMO case, however, we need not only to investigate
and tell an empirical story (although we attempt to do just that), we need also to ground
that story within generalizable theoretical accounts of comparative public policymaking,
historical institutionalism, international networks and regimes, international law, and
dispute resolution.  In one sense, therefore, this book is of “applied theory,” using a range
of off-the-shelf theories of politics and law to analyze and think critically about one of
the vital public-policy issues of our day.  At the same time, however, we believe that our
analysis of the GMO case has implications for broader theoretical inquiry, providing an
important test case for theories of public policy-making, network governance, and
deliberation, and generating new and novel insights and hypotheses about the workings
of international “regime complexes,” forum-shopping among international regimes, and
the interaction of hard and soft law.   Hence, we seek in this book to borrow from
theoretical literatures on domestic and international law and politics, but also to give back
to those literatures as well.
Second, we believe the conflict is emblematic of issues that will increasingly arise
in the future in an economically globalized world characterized by rapid technological
changes whose effects are uncertain. Future technological developments, including
agricultural biotechnology, will affect a broad spectrum of concerns, ranging from
international  competitiveness,  trade  and  investment,  research  and  development,
environmental risk, human and animal welfare, consumer notification and choice, the
ethics of new research, the relative roles of scientific and political oversight of regulatory
                                                            
8 That is, in a world where agricultural trade continues to grow faster than agricultural production, and
where the global food distribution system cannot guarantee the segregation of seed varieties, the resolution
of the regulatory conflict between the US and EU will facilitate or impede the adoption of agricultural
biotechnology, and, in this way, will shape the future of agriculture. The average yearly growth for world
agricultural exports since 1951 is 3.6% (since 1980 it is 3.0%).  The average yearly growth for world
agricultural production since 1951 is 2.5% (since 1980 it is 2.2%).  See WTO 2005 (containing a table that
lists yearly changes in world agricultural exports and world agricultural production since 1951).  See also
Josling et al 2004: xx.11
approvals, and the impact of foreign and international law and of global markets on
national decision-making and local social orders.  Understanding how domestic polities
have governed the new technology of GM foods and crops, and how international
networks and regimes have succeeded or failed in coordinating domestic regulations, is
therefore a crucial first step in understanding the regulatory challenges to be faced in the
regulation of other new technologies in the years to come.
In this introduction, and in the subsequent chapters of the book, we offer five
inter-related arguments about the origins of the dispute, the difficulties of resolving the
dispute both bilaterally and multilaterally, the impact of international and transnational
developments on domestic regulatory systems, and finally the risks and potential rewards
of legal recourse to the WTO.  First, the United States and the European Union have
adopted  starkly  different  standards  and  systems  for  the  regulation  of  agricultural
biotechnology.  These distinctive regulatory approaches, examined in Chapter 2, have led
to increasing trade conflicts and potential legal disputes between the two sides, spurring
calls for greater international cooperation.  The causes of these regulatory differences, we
argue, are complex, reflecting underlying transatlantic differences in organized interests,
political institutions, and ideas about food and technology, as well as contingent events.
Although multiple factors contributed, we show why the best explanation for the
differences lies not in innate, or “essentialist” forms of culture (such as US and European
attitudes  toward  food,  risk  or  technology),  nor  in  institutions  alone  (such  as  US
specialized agencies compared to European political processes), but in the ability of
interest groups to frame public perceptions and debates over this technology, and its
uncertain costs and benefits, in light of the opportunities provided by these cultural
differences and institutional structures, combined with important, contingent events. The
stark differences in the US and EU regulatory systems were not preordained, we argue,
by the interest-group, institutional or cultural configurations of the two sides; but the
differences are real, and the two systems, once in place, have proven increasingly
resistant to change, even as friction between them threatened to lead to a global trade
war.
Second, we argue that the record of transatlantic cooperation on GMOs has12
largely been one of failure, despite hopes for a new type of bilateral collaboration through
flexible and deliberative networks of government regulators.9 Through such networks,
both officials and academic analysts believed that US and EU officials might engage in
joint analysis and joint deliberation of the core issues of risk regulation, putting aside
fixed  positions  and  negotiating  tactics  in  favor  of  a  collective  search  for  better
understanding and better policy.  Although there have been joint transatlantic meetings of
scientists, government officials and civil society representatives, examined in Chapter 3,
the record of US/EU regulatory cooperation on agricultural biotechnology has shown
only limited evidence of genuine deliberation, or at least of deliberation that has had
policy consequences.  Deliberation, we argue, is a hothouse flower that flourishes only
under restrictive conditions, and the sharp disagreements, intense politicization, and
distributive conflicts that characterize agricultural biotechnology have all prevented US
and EU policymakers from engaging in a deliberative search for the best policy in this
area.
Third, we argue that the record of multilateral cooperation, undertaken within
regimes such as the WTO, the Convention on Biodiversity, the OECD, and the Codex
Alimentarius Commission, has been similarly limited, characterized largely by strategic
maneuvering by both sides to “export” their own standards and their own principles for
risk regulation, and to “forum shop” among the regimes most likely to produce each
side’s  favored  outcomes.  These  maneuvers  have  given  rise  to  overlapping  and
(sometimes purposefully) inconsistent regimes for trade, the environment, and food
safety, whose inconsistencies reflect the conflict between the two sides (Chapter 4). The
result is that these regimes can constrain each other’s operations, at least as they were
initially intended to function. The WTO trade regime, with its “hard” binding rules
backed  by  compulsory  dispute  settlement,  has  affected  negotiations  in  “soft  law”
regimes, such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission, which is to be based on voluntary
standards that lead to progressively harmonized regulatory policies. In turn, “softer”
regimes (in the sense that third party dispute settlement is not used), such as the
Convention on Biodiversity and its Biosafety Protocol, have arguably “softened” the
impact of what had been considered “hard” binding WTO rules by signaling to WTO
                                                            
9 Slaughter 2004.13
dispute settlement panels to tread lightly in this domain, as demonstrated (we argue) by
the WTO judicial decision in the GMO case.
Fourth, we maintain that the failures of bilateral and multilateral cooperation are
reflected in the ongoing differences between the US and EU regulatory systems for
agricultural biotechnology, which continue to differ fundamentally in their respective
approaches despite the US and EU’s modification of their regulatory frameworks and
administrative practices. There has, to be sure, been some domestic change on both sides
of the Atlantic, due at least in part to external pressures from international markets and
international regimes. On the US side, regulators have increased requirements for trials
before the commercial release of many GM seeds so that these varieties, in fact, are
treated distinctly from more conventional ones, despite official US proclamations to the
contrary. Even in the absence of tightened regulation, moreover, US farmers have
demonstrated a reluctance to adopt new GM foods and crops which they fear will be
rejected  in  the  EU  and  other  large  export  markets.   In  the  EU,  meanwhile,  the
Commission and biotech companies have been somewhat empowered by international
developments to resume approvals of new GM varieties after a long moratorium and to
challenge member state bans against those already formally approved. In both the US and
the EU, however, such changes have taken place at the margins of regulatory systems that
remain unchanged in their fundamental approaches, reflecting long-standing adaptations
to existing regulations by private interests, institutional inertia, and veto players who have
managed to impede significant reforms on either side the Atlantic even in the face of
considerable pressures for change.   In sum, while the story is an ongoing one, the
fundamental  divergences  remain.   In  some  ways,  in  Europe  we  have  seen  much
regulatory reform without fundamental change, and in the US, (some) change without
regulatory reform although with little substantive difference in outcomes.
Fifth and finally, in light of the scant record of international cooperation and of
regulatory convergence, we suggest that, despite considerable risks, the United States’
complaint before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, analyzed in Chapter 6, has offered
the prospect of some clarification and mutual accommodation that had thus far eluded the
two sides in other bilateral and multilateral fora. In particular, we show how the WTO
has constrained the conflict by channeling it into a “legal” process and thereby deflecting14
pressure within the US to aggressively and unilaterally retaliate against Europe, which
may have occurred had there been no WTO. The WTO has simultaneously empowered
political actors in the EU, including within the European Commission which would like
to defend the competitiveness of European biotech research and development, and, in the
process, somewhat accommodate US concerns through creating individualized GMO
evaluation and approval procedures based on reasoned decisions, even though the
procedures are quite demanding in practice.
In the final chapter of the book, we conclude by offering a brief summary of our
findings and examining the implications of our study for the future of agricultural
biotechnology, in particular for developing countries, as well as the broader implications
of the GMO case for the study of international politics and international law.   We
maintain that in a world of rapid technological change, new conflicts over divergent
regulations  will  continue  to  arise.  New  and  existing  transnational  networks  and
multilateral regimes become sites where the underlying conflicts manifest themselves. In
the  process,  these  international  regimes  affect  (and  often  constrain)  each  other’s
operations. Yet, in the end, while international institutions have been demonized by some
and dubbed irrelevant by others, we show how they can channel conflict, even when
confronted with highly politicized issues in which state representatives engage in
strategic maneuvering and little deliberation. We show, as well, how they can empower
domestic actors, leading (potentially) to some accommodation of difference and some
convergence  of  practice.  We  conclude  by  offering  our  view  that,  in  the  end,  the
technology will be gradually accepted, but within significant market constraints for GM
foods. With the rise of China, India and Brazil as players in the world economy, and as
growers of GM products in particular, we examine how the future of agricultural
biotechnology may lie in large part in other countries’ responses to what was initially a
US-European conflict.
The  rest  of  this  introductory  chapter  sets  the  stage  for  these  arguments,
introducing the challenges of genetic engineering and risk regulation and laying out the
essential elements of our arguments about the nature of the dispute, the difficulties of
bilateral  and  multilateral  cooperation,  the  lack  (thus  far)  of  fundamental  US/EU
convergence,  and  the  prospects  for  policy  accommodation  through  the  WTO,  an15
institution that itself has been subject to severe public challenge.
1.1  Agricultural Biotechnology, Risk Regulation, and the Origins of Transatlantic
Conflict
Genetic engineering, the process used to create GM seeds, crops, and the foods
produced  from  them,  is  a  technology  used  to  isolate  genes  from  one  organism,
manipulate them in the laboratory, and inject them into another organism.  Supporters of
agricultural biotechnology consider such genetic manipulation to be merely the latest step
in an ongoing scientific process, from the farmer’s “old-fashioned” selection of seeds and
Mendelian cross-breeding to the mapping of plant and animal genetic codes.   These
supporters argue that the characteristics of these new plant varieties offer significant
benefits to both producers and consumers.  The benefits to producers have been most
evident in the “first generation” of GM crops, as new GM varieties can provide greater
efficiency and lower costs in agricultural production. As an extensive report of the Pew
Initiative on Food and Biotechnology states, “For the most part, this first generation of
agricultural biotechnology products consists of single-gene, single-trait modifications
made for agronomic purposes, primarily to make crops pest resistant or herbicide
tolerant.”10 For example, the predominant genetically modified trait for corn, known as
Bt  corn,  genetically  incorporates  resistance  to  the  predatory  corn  borer.11  The
predominant  trait  for  soybeans,  such  as  Monsanto  Corporation’s  Roundup-Ready
soybeans, genetically incorporates resistance to the commercial Roundup herbicide.
Direct consumer benefits, by contrast, have been less immediately evident, since
the most common GM crops require less maintenance by farmers without enhancing the
quality or reducing the price of the product to the consumer.12 At least in theory,
however, GM crops could benefit consumers, including the world’s poor, by increasing
crop yields, critical for food-scarce regions and thus reducing prices. They could also
provide important health benefits by adding vitamins and nutrients to conventional crops,
                                                            
10 Pew Initiative 2004: 3.
11 “Bt” designates “a gene isolated from the soil bacterium, Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) [which] encodes a
pesticide and when this gene is inserted into the plant, the plant can then produce the Bt pesticidal
substance.”  NBII  Frequently  Asked  Questions,  available  at
http://usbiotechreg.nbii.gov/include/FAQRecord.asp?qryGUID=5.
12 Bernauer 2003: 7.16
resulting in products such vitamin A-enhanced rice, “heart-friendly” oil, and iron-
enriched wheat.13  For advocates of GM foods and crops, it is these long-term benefits,
together with the short-term cost advantages to farmers, which constitute the promise of
agricultural biotechnology. Blocking advances in this technology entails its own risks,
they contend, to human life and health, especially in poorer countries.14 A major study of
the FAO in its 2003-04 The State of Food and Agriculture concludes,
Thus far, in those countries where transgenic crops have been grown, there
have been no verifiable reports of them causing any significant health or
environmental harm… On the contrary, some important environmental
and social benefits are emerging. Farmers are using less pesticide and are
replacing toxic chemicals with less harmful ones. As a result farm works
and water supplies are protected from poisons, and beneficial insects and
birds are returning to farmers’ fields.15
GM supporters maintain, moreover, that the health risks from eating organic
foods is much greater than for genetically modified ones,16 as shown, to give one
example, by the e-coli-tainted bagged spinach from Natural Selection Foods that killed at
least three people and sickened over two hundred others in the US in the fall of 2006.17
In fact, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention “estimate that each year in the
United States, 76 million people get sick, 325,000 are hospitalized, and 5,000 die from
                                                            
13 See Pew Initiative 2004:3 (“The next generation of GE crop varieties will likely include a wider range
of desirable agronomic traits, including drought tolerance. Food crops may be modified with traits to
improve freshness, taste, and nutrition”). Until they do so, however, there will remain a “legitimacy” gap
between the claims of GM advocates and the characteristics of GM products on the market. (Bernauer
2003: 19).
14 See e.g.,. Sunstein 2004: 31-32 (pointing to Zambians turning down US genetically engineered corn,
leaving “2.9 million people at risk of starvation,” based on World Health Organization data).
15 FAO (2003-04: 76).
16 See e.g. Botkin 1996: 25-27 (maintaining that organic foods are “actually riskier to consume than food
grown with synthetic chemicals”).
17 See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Spinach and E-coli Outbreak,
http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/hottopics/spinach.html  (last visited Feb. 7, 2007). The spinach implicated
in the outbreak was traced back to Natural Selection Foods LLC of San Juan Bautista, California.17
food-related illnesses,” so that assuring food safety is rightly a major concern.18 All the
attention given to GM foods, it may be argued, is diversionary, stripping resources from
other areas, and thus arguably increasing food safety risks.
Biotechnology’s skeptics, by contrast, have raised concerns over food safety,
environmental  harm,  agribusiness  power,  and  ethics,  pointing  to  longer-term
uncertainties.   Many skeptics question the safety of GM foods, maintaining that they
could encourage perverse selection for antibiotic resistance (through the consumption of
foods with antibiotic marker genes) or trigger allergenic reactions (though the ingestion
of genes introduced from foreign species, such as peanuts).  Environmental skeptics raise
fears that the technology could lead to monocultures, impairing biodiversity, and give rise
to “super weeds” and “super bugs” through cross-pollination and pest adaptation.
Skeptics contend that GM varieties could reduce biodiversity and potentially wreak
unintended consequences on other species in the food chain as they become widespread.
Advocates of small scale agriculture maintain that patented GM seed varieties favor
agribusinesses, and threaten the livelihoods of small-scale farmers throughout the
world.19 To the extent pollen from GM plants travel, it could cross-breed with organic
varieties, undermining the prospect of alternative GM-free organic agriculture.
Some opponents also raise ethical concerns that complement ones based on risk
and uncertainty. They question the morality of mankind’s manipulation of genes in the
first place, characterized by a statement of Britain’s Prince Charles that the production of
GM foods “takes mankind into realms that belong to God and to God alone.”20   The
genetic  engineering  of  animals  provides  a  clear  example  of  how  ethical  issues
complement  environmental  ones.   For  example,  faster-growing  GM  salmon  could
potentially cross-breed with wild species, eventually wiping them out and degrading
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larger ecosystems.21 To the extent humans have any ethical obligation to other species,22
genetic engineering could trigger their destruction. Now that applications regarding
genetically engineered animals and products derived from them are proceeding through
the US regulatory process, with one GM ornamental fish already being commercialized,
debates over ethical concerns could intensify.23   
Finally,  cultural  theorists  of  risk  maintain  that  the  management  of  risk  is
fundamentally a reflection of cultural “values,” and thus raise fundamental issues of
democratic control of science. They contend that if they are correct that “risk disputes are
really disputes over the good life, then the challenge that risk regulation poses for
democracy  is  less  how  to  reconcile  public  sensibilities  with  science  than  how  to
accommodate diverse visions of the good within a popular system of regulation.”24 In the
case of multiple jurisdictions, the challenge is greater still, namely how to accommodate
multiple, conflicting and overlapping sets of regulations, each reflecting a distinctive
conception of “the good life.” In that context, the spread of GM varieties patented by US-
based companies is often seen as one more reflection of US cultural hegemony, and an
attack on alternative ways of living.
These debates over risks and benefits have largely been framed in the West, and
in particular in the United States and Europe, without taking into account the perspectives
and priorities of those in other parts of the world. Proponents in the US and Europe refer
to the needs of developing countries, stressing the potential of GM foods to reduce
malnutrition and disease. Skeptics point to the biodiversity challenges posed by GM crop
monocultures  and  the  adverse  social  impacts  for  developing  country  farmers  of
widespread use of seeds owned and controlled by US and European multinational
companies. In the context of these struggles over defining principles (e.g. science and
precaution) and their enactment in formal law, developing countries must balance their
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desire for access to European commercial markets and their competition with US and
other agricultural exporters, along with local concerns. Although he FAO has noted case
studies showing “how biotech can be deployed to help the poor and hungry,”25 the
evaluation of the prospects and risks of agricultural biotechnology for these countries and
their constituencies have so far taken a backseat to US-European commercial, regulatory
and cognitive framings. We examine the potential for a shift in such framings in chapter
7.
Crucially,  we  argue  in  this  book,  biotechnology  regulation  concerns  the
regulation  of  technological  risk  under  uncertainty  in  an  economically  and
environmentally interdependent world, which, in consequence, pits specific regulatory
standards  and  broader  regulatory  systems  of  powerful  states  against  each  other.
However, from here, supporters and opponents of the US and EU approaches quickly
divide. Supporters of the new technology tend to focus on the scientific assessment of its
risks that can be measured and managed, while skeptics tend to focus on the uncertainty
that belies the possibility of any meaningful measurement of long-term effects, calling for
greater precaution and the recognition of different values underlying risk perceptions.
To start with the concept of risk, it refers to “the combination of the likelihood
(probability) and the harm (adverse  outcome, e.g. mortality, morbidity, ecological
damage, or impaired quality of life) resulting from exposure to an activity (hazard).”26
In principle, regulators faced with a novel product or process – such as the genetic
modification of foods and crops – need to ascertain the potential harm caused by such
activities, the probability of such harm, and the costs and benefits of feasible alternatives,
in order to take a decision on the legality, illegality, or regulatory conditions for that
product or process.
In many ways, such decision-making over technological risk is similar to what
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Weber identified as “calculation” on the part of the capitalist entrepreneur.27  The
entrepreneur is uncertain of the state of the world, but engages in ventures which involve
risk. In making an investment, the entrepreneur must calculate risk under uncertainty.
And so it is with regulators and scientists when they assess technological risk. They are
uncertain what they know, and there is risk in what they venture.  Yet there is a huge
difference between them and the entrepreneur. The risk for the entrepreneur is a private
one. For the regulator, it is a public risk, one that, in some cases, could be catastrophic.
Skeptics of the technology, in contrast, tend to focus on the uncertainty of its
effects, insisting that uncertainty is a different concept than risk, and entails not just
differences in degree.   They point to the classic Knightian distinction that risk is
something that one can calculate, while uncertainty is something that one cannot.28
Taking from sociologists such as Ulrich Beck, some argue that, with such modern
industrially produced risks, “the actual consequences ultimately become more and more
incalculable.”29  They maintain that what one cannot control with GMOs, in particular,
are the long-term ecological effects of their adoption, effects that cannot be estimated,
modeled or predicted. Skeptics also raise the complementary concept of ignorance, in
which “not only the probabilities, but also some possibilities may be unknown.”30 That
is, the very nature of the possible harm and its magnitude are unknown. They thus focus
on the need for considerable precaution regarding the adoption of such new agricultural
production processes. Finally, they argue that risk assessments under uncertainty are
inherently value-laden, since the perception of risk itself reflects cultural predispositions,
including among scientists.31
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Leading sociologists such as Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens contend that
questions of risk regulation have become defining traits of modern society.32 They
theorize “modernity” in terms of the emergence of what they call a “risk society” in
which risks are increasingly “manufactured,” as opposed to being “natural” or “external”
to human activity, in which they no longer consist of personally assumed risks, but
become “global” in their potential consequences, and in which the management of risks
becomes a defining element of societal conflict and social understanding, including at the
global level.33 As Giddens writes, “Risk is the mobilizing dynamic of a society bent on
change, that wants to determine its own future rather than leaving it to religion, tradition,
or the vagaries of nature.”34  As Beck puts it, “in advanced modernity, the social
production of wealth is systematically accompanied by the social production of risks.
Accordingly, the problems and conflicts related to distribution in a society of scarcity
overlap with the problems and conflicts that arise from the production, definition and
distribution of techno-scientifically produced risks.”35
Supporters of the technology, however, maintain that it is an error to focus on
uncertainty because science admits for little certainty. Rather, science focuses on degrees
of risk that can be tested and reduced. They contend not only that there are potential
costs, but also potential benefits from the technology that need to be assessed and
compared. In fact, Knight developed the very concept of uncertainty in an attempt to
explain “profit” the title of his famous book being Risk, Uncertainty and Profit.36 Were
society to attempt to eliminate uncertainty, it would also eliminate great and beneficial
technological  changes,  from  the  airplane  to  electricity.  As  regards  agricultural
biotechnology, proponents maintain that the GM seeds and foods at issue pose no greater
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risk than conventional varieties, and offer substantial potential benefits. The United
States, they argue, has provided a free laboratory experiment for the world in which GM-
derived crops and foods have been grown and consumed for over ten years without any
proven harm. Had there been harm to humans, animals or the environment, proponents
argue, surely it would have been uncovered in the United States which has the strongest
tort-liability system in the world.
Whether or not one accepts the claim that we live in a fundamentally different
form of society in which the regulation of manufactured risks is a defining trait, risk
regulation requires regulators, in practice, to act in the face of uncertainty regarding the
nature  and  extent  of  the  risks  posed  by  new  products  and  processes.  Dynamic
technological change raises fundamental questions about how it should be governed.
Faced  with  decisions  involving  risk  under  uncertainty,  regulators  often  take
precautionary measures, regulating or banning certain products or activities in the
absence of complete information about the risks posed.
In a review of comparative risk regulation, Giandomenico Majone categorizes
four distinct ways in which government regulators in the United States and other
jurisdictions have responded to risks, listing them in order of decreasing regulatory
severity  (or  increasing  rationality,  depending  on  one’s  perspective):  prohibitions,
requirements  for  the  least  feasible  risk,  elimination  of  only  significant  risks,  and
regulation based on cost-benefit analysis. More concretely, regulators have responded to
risks (1) by imposing product bans; (2) by setting standards that minimize risk “to the
extent feasible;” (3) by enacting requirements to eliminate “significant risks,” typically
following a risk assessment procedure; and/or (4) by engaging in cost-benefit analysis,
prohibiting a product or process only to the extent that one calculates that its risks
outweigh its benefits, possibly leaving for a margin of error. Majone maintains that there
has been a general trend over time from (what is in his view) the first and least
sophisticated to the fourth and most sophisticated approach.   Under the first of these
approaches, regulators exercise a high degree of precaution by simply banning any
product (e.g. food additives) that can be shown to pose some level of risk to human health
(e.g. carcinogens).  While clearly motivated by a concern for human health, such outright
bans ignore the potential social benefits of the banned products, as well as the probability23
of risk posed by a given product, which in the case of carcinogens can run the gamut
from significant to highly improbable.  For this reason, he argues that regulators in the
United States and elsewhere have moved over time towards other, less blunt, approaches
toward risk regulation.37
According to Majone’s second principle, regulators are required to set standards
that minimize risk “to the extent feasible.”  This standard is more discriminating than
outright prohibition, but it begs the question of technological or economic feasibility, and
once again makes no distinction between significant and minor risks.  For this reason,
Majone contends, US lawmakers, regulators and courts moved during the 1970s and
1980s toward a third approach, in which the goal of regulators was not to eliminate all
risk but rather significant risks. This approach required regulatory agencies to engage in
scientific  (and  typically  quantitative)  risk  assessments  as  the  basis  for  new  risk
regulations.  Fourth and finally, he contends that this gradual process of policy learning
culminated in the use of cost-benefit analysis as the basis for all risk regulation.  Such an
approach involves not only the use of scientific risk assessments as the basis for assessing
the risk of a new product or process, but also the economic calculation of the potential
costs and benefits of proposed regulations. These regulations would be adopted only if
the net benefits offered to society exceeded their costs.   In the space of some three
decades, Majone concludes, American policymakers, regulators and courts progressed to
a sophisticated approach to risk regulation, relying on scientific assessments of risk as
well as economic assessments of costs and benefits – “an outstanding, and in many
respects unique, case of policy learning.”38
While a useful heuristic device to understand the range of possible approaches to
regulating risk under uncertainty, Majone’s classification scheme simplifies a complex
US response to risk that today combines elements of all four approaches under different
laws and in different areas.  Even more importantly for our purposes, this ideal-typical
progression fails to capture parallel developments in Europe, where risk regulation took
place largely within national contexts until the 1980s, when EU institutions began to play
an increasing role in harmonizing risk regulation across the EU’s various member states.
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In the EU context, David Vogel and others have argued, Europe’s approach to
risk regulation has evolved quite differently than in the United States.39   Whereas the
former began with highly precautionary legislation in areas like the environment,
consumer  protection,  and  worker  health  and  safety,  only  to  adopt  scientific  risk
assessment and cost-benefit analysis more recently, regulators in Europe have arguably
become more precautionary and more risk-averse over time. Vogel writes:
Between the 1960s and the 1990s, a number of US regulations were more
stringent, innovating and comprehensive than those adopted by European
countries and the EC/EU.  However, since the mid 1980s, this pattern has
changed.  Now in a number of significant areas of regulatory policy, EU
regulations are more stringent, innovative, and comprehensive than those
adopted by the US.  Prior to the mid 1980s, US policy-makers identified
more products and processes as posing unacceptable risks to public health
or the environment than did regulatory authorities in Europe.  Now the
latter regard a number of products and processes as posing unacceptable
risks to consumers and the environment that US policy-makers do not.
Since the mid 1980s, the political influence of constituencies favoring
more risk averse regulatory policies have strengthened in Europe while
since the early 1990s it has declined in the US.  Likewise, since the mid
1980s regulatory politics and issues have become more politically salient
in Europe, while since the early 1990s, they have declined in the US.40
In effect, Vogel maintains, US and EU risk regulation resemble “ships passing in the
night,” with the EU becoming more precautionary and the US less precautionary over
time.   A central cause of this increasingly precautionary approach, Vogel and others
argue, has been the long series of European regulatory failures and crises over the past
several decades, including most notably the BSE or “mad cow” crisis discussed in
Chapter 2.  As we shall see, these crises have weakened public trust in EU regulators and
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scientific risk assessments, increased support for highly precautionary regulations, and
called into question European publics’ acceptance of the legitimacy of EU regulations
and EU institutions.41   Responding to this crisis of legitimacy, EU institutions have
moved aggressively to overhaul EU risk regulation across a range of areas, adopting strict
new regulations for products and processes like genetically modified foods and crops and
elevating the “precautionary principle” to play a defining role in EU regulation, as
examined in Chapter 5.42
Other scholars dispute Vogel’s “ships passing in the night” characterization of US
and EU risk regulation, noting that the purported “flip-flop” in US and EU approaches to
risk regulation draws disproportionately from a few controversial issues, such as the use
of growth hormones in cattle and the regulation of GMOs.  In a wide-ranging survey of
US and European risk regulation, Jonathan Wiener and Michael Rogers find a more
complex set of outcomes, in which the US is more precautionary in some areas (e.g.
nuclear energy, particulate air pollution) while the EU demonstrates greater precaution in
others (e.g. GMOs, hormone-treated beef). They contend that “[t]his broader analysis
indicates that neither the US nor the EU is a more precautionary actor across the board,
today or in the past.  Relative precaution appears to depend more on the particular risk
than on the country or the era.”43
For this reason, we resist characterizing either the US or the EU as the more risk-
averse  in  general,  i.e.,  beyond  the  specific  context  of  agricultural  biotechnology.
However, we do emphasize the difficulty of biotechnology regulation as a form of risk
regulation under uncertainty, which raises central questions regarding the interrelation of
conflicting environmental, food safety and trade laws at the domestic, regional, and
international levels.  As we shall see in detail in Chapter 2, the United States and the
European  Union  have  taken  starkly  different  approaches  to  the  regulation  of
biotechnology. In the United States, the basic regulatory framework was set in 1986 by
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executive action, when the Reagan Administration’s Office of Science and Technology
Policy (OSTP) issued a “Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology”
that continues to shape US biotech regulation to the present day.  Simplifying slightly, the
US regulatory framework is based on the premise that the techniques of biotechnology
are not inherently risky and that biotechnology can therefore be adequately regulated by
existing federal agencies under existing statutes, obviating the need for new legislation
dedicated to genetically modified organisms. The Coordinated Framework established a
division of responsibility among three primary US regulators, with the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) serving as the primary regulator of GM foods, the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) charged with oversight of the planting of GM crops,
and  the  Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA)  responsible  for  overseeing  the
environmental and food safety impact of GM crops that have pesticidal characteristics.
Crucially, these three agencies have generally regulated GM foods and crops in terms of
the characteristics of the product, rather than in terms of the process by which they are
produced, although there has been some interesting changes in US regulatory practice
(examined in Chapter 5).
By comparison with the United States, EU regulation of biotechnology was far
more decentralized, with a decision-making process in which the key decisions were
taken not by a specialized regulatory agency like the FDA, but by political bodies such as
the  Council  of  Ministers,  Commission,  and  European  Parliament,  in  an  uneasy
cooperation with “competent authorities” in each of the member states.  The EU has also
taken a far more precautionary and stricter approach to biotech regulation, adopting by
legislation  a  specific  and  increasingly  demanding  regulatory  procedure  for  the
environmental release and marketing of GM foods and crops.  According to the terms of
a 1990 directive (since amended and elaborated by subsequent legislation), all genetically
modified foods and crops are subject to a special authorization procedure, requiring
scientific risk assessment by national and/or European regulators and featuring much
greater involvement of political officials in the Union’s regulatory committees and in the
Council of Ministers.  In practice, this procedure has led to a much slower approval of
new GM varieties in Europe, and in particular to a six-year (1998-2004) moratorium on
the approval of GM varieties in the Council.   Even officially approved varieties,27
moreover, have had to meet additional hurdles, including recently adopted EU provisions
for the labeling and traceability of GM crops, the prospect of national-level bans on
specific GM foods and crops  approved at the EU level, and boycotts of GM products by
consumers and retailers.
The causes of these starkly different regulatory approaches are examined in
Chapter 2. Surveying the various accounts of GMO regulation in the US and the EU, we
identify four classes of explanation for the observed differences.  As we shall see, some
analysts stress cultural differences in European and American attitudes toward food or
toward risk, with the US purportedly more risk-acceptant than the EU; some point to
institutional differences in US and European assessments and management of risk,
including the existence of independent regulatory agencies in the US, and the larger
number of institutional actors or “veto players” in the EU; some highlight differences in
interest group configurations, with the US being characterized by a larger and more
politically influential biotech sector; and some note the differential impact of contingent
events such as the European food-safety crises of the 1990s.  Against that background, we
argue that the very different approaches to GMO regulation that we observe between the
United States and the European Union were not determined in any straightforward way
by either the institutions or the political culture or the interest-group configurations
present on either side of the Atlantic.  It was not inevitable that US regulators would
adopt a product-based approach to GMO regulation, nor was it obvious from the outset
that the EU would adopt the strict, politicized and highly precautionary system that
emerged over the course of the 1990s.  The best explanation for the observed transatlantic
differences, we believe, is multi-causal, lying in the ability of interest groups to capitalize
on pre-existing cultural and institutional differences, with an important role played by
contingent events such as the European food safety scandals of the 1990s.
 In the US case, powerful interest groups, including the biotech industry and
farmers’ associations, sought a regulatory framework that would treat new GM varieties
as substantively equivalent to their conventional counterparts, and in doing so they were
able to draw on a supportive institutional and cultural context, including a regulatory
system featuring strong and relatively independent government regulators, a diverse
consumer protection movement that was divided on GMO regulation, and a cultural28
tradition of accepting the use of new technologies in food production.  Yet contingent
events also played a role, including the preferences of a Reagan Administration that
shaped a Coordinated Framework giving primary responsibility to the FDA at the
expense of the more precautionary EPA.  In Europe, by contrast, pro-GMO interests in
Europe were weaker, with a smaller biotech sector and an agricultural community which
was slow to take up GM foods and crops and never emerged as a champion of the new
technology, and they did indeed encounter an institutional and cultural framework that
provided multiple veto points and multiple sources of opposition (on environmental,
food-safety, and ethical grounds) to GMOs, resulting in the more demanding, politicized
and process-oriented EU regulatory system.   The subsequent evolution of the EU
regulatory process in the direction of ever-greater precaution, however, is in large part a
direct result of contingent events, namely the BSE crisis and other food-safety scandals of
the 1990s which undermined public support for the technology and trust in regulators at a
crucial time in the introduction of GM foods and crops.
Neither the United States nor the European Union, then, was preordained by its
interest-group, institutional or cultural characteristics to adopt the precise regulatory
framework that each side adopted when the technology of genetic engineering and the
prospect of GM foods and crops emerged as a public-policy issue in the 1980s and early
1990s.  By the same token, we argue throughout this book that the respective US and EU
regulatory frameworks, once adopted, have proven remarkably resilient in their essential
characteristics.  The explanation for this resilience, we argue, can be found in historical
institutionalist theory, which examines the effects of institutions on politics over time,
maintaining that institutional choices taken at one point in time can persist, or become
“locked in,” thereby shaping and constraining actors later in time.  Political institutions
and public policies, in this view, are subject to “increasing returns,” insofar as those
institutions and policies generate incentives for actors to stick with and not abandon
existing  institutions,  adapting  them  only  incrementally  to  changing  political
environments.  These increasing returns may reflect constraints from above, in the form
of legally binding rules that are difficult or costly for political actors to change, or from
below, as societal actors adapt to and develop a vested interest in the continuation of29
specific public policies.44
Insofar as political institutions and public policies are in fact characterized by
increasing returns, politics will be characterized by certain interrelated phenomena,
including:  inertia, or lock-ins, whereby existing institutions may remain in equilibrium
for extended periods despite considerable political change; a critical role for timing and
sequencing, in which relatively small and contingent events that occur at critical
junctures early in a sequence shape (that is, provide the institutional context for) events
that occur later; and path-dependence, in which early decisions provide incentives for
actors to perpetuate institutional and policy choices inherited from the past, even when
the resulting outcomes are manifestly inefficient.   At the extreme, institutions and
policies can become self-reinforcing, such that the operation of the institution or policy
not only resists change, but bolsters its societal support base in such a way that the
institution becomes more difficult to change, and more stable in the face of external
shocks, over time.
In  this  context,  we  argue  that  the  US  and  EU  regulatory  frameworks  for
agricultural biotechnology, while not themselves determined by pre-existing institutional
constraints, have since generated significant increasing returns, lending each system
considerable resistance to change, and indeed making each system self-reinforcing.  In
each case, timing and sequencing have proven vital, as the initial regulatory frameworks
were adopted at critical junctures that shaped subsequent developments.  In the US case,
the critical juncture occurred in the mid-1980s, when the introduction of agricultural
biotechnology and of GM foods and crops presented policy-makers with a crucial set of
choices.  In  this  context,  the  Reagan  Administration  laid  down  a  comprehensive
regulatory framework within existing statutory authority, with results that came close to
the preferences of the biotech industry.  The critical juncture in the EU came a few years
later, in the context of a European Union with a relatively weakly organized biotech
industry, diverse preferences among EU governments, and a decision-making system
with a large number of veto points, with the result that the EU’s initial regulatory
framework laid down a more demanding regulatory procedure closer to the preferences of
GM opponents.  In addition, a further critical juncture arguably came during the second
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half of the 1990s in the EU, when the BSE and other food-safety scandals strengthened
the position of those actors who sought to make the EU’s regulatory framework even
more restrictive, resulting in the post-1998 moratorium and the subsequent strengthening
of the regulatory framework early the following decade.
Just  as  importantly,  in  each  case  the  regulatory  frameworks  adopted  have
generated increasing returns, both by creating institutional rules that could be changed
only with difficulty, and by generating adaptations among interest groups and public
opinion that contributed the stability of the two respective frameworks.  In the US case,
the early adoption of a relatively welcoming regulatory framework contributed to the
rapid growth of the biotech industry and the equally rapid adoption of GM crops by
American farmers, who have represented the bulwark of political support for the existing
framework in the face of environmental and food-safety contention about GMOs. In the
European Union case, by contrast, the early adoption of a relatively restrictive regulatory
framework, together with the turn against GMOs in public opinion and the subsequent
declaration of a de facto moratorium, discouraged farmers from planting GM crops,
prompted retailers to resist GM foods, and led to the flight of agricultural biotech
investment from Europe, further undermining societal support for GM foods and crops.
At the same time, the EU’s convoluted legislative process, requiring qualified majorities
among the member states in the Council of Ministers and an absolute majority of a
European  Parliament  that  has  turned  largely  against  GMOs,  has  created  a  huge
institutional hurdle to the reform of the EU regulatory framework.  Hence, the politics of
GMOs, which were arguably fluid during the early years of the technology, have become
increasingly  rigid  in  both  polities,  with  strong  resistance  and  high  thresholds  to
fundamental change on either side.
Whatever their causes, the stark and persistent differences between the two
systems have led to serious transatlantic tensions, as US biotech producers and farmers
have found themselves increasingly unable to export GM foods and crops that have been
found to be safe by US federal regulators to Europe, or to countries following Europe’s
example.  As a result, the US has brought increasing pressure on the EU to facilitate the
approval of new GM varieties, culminating in the bringing of a WTO complaint against
the EU in May of 2003.  The stark contrast between the US and EU regulatory systems,31
therefore, is not simply a compelling case of comparative public-policy analysis. It has
become the source of serious transatlantic and international trade disputes, reflective of
conflicts over divergent regulatory approaches that we will continue to see in the future.
1.2  The Promise, and Failure, of Transatlantic Cooperation
The relationship between the US and the EU is not, of course, purely conflictual,
despite the real and significant differences among them over the regulation of GM foods
and crops.  While the trade impact of different regulations presents a clear potential for
conflict, the US and the European Union remain each others’ largest trading partners and
sources of direct foreign investment, as well as political and military allies, and these
common interests provide a strong incentive for both sides to cooperate to achieve a
unified approach to the regulation of GM food and crops – or, failing that, to prevent the
GM issue escalating into a full-scale transatlantic trade war.  Toward this end, the US and
the EU have engaged in efforts at both bilateral and multilateral cooperation on GM
issues since the 1990s, seeking common understandings, if not common standards, on the
regulation of agricultural biotechnology.  These efforts reflected scholarly claims about
the promise of transgovernmental networks of regulators and about the ability of
international regimes to encourage international cooperation under anarchy.  In practice,
however, both of these routes – bilateral cooperation among US and EU regulators, as
well as multilateral cooperation in various international regimes – have proven relatively
disappointing, providing as yet no clear solution to the fundamental differences between
the two sides’ approaches.
International  relations  and  international  legal  scholars  have  pointed  to  the
prospect of international governance through so-called “transgovernmental networks” of
lower-level government officials cooperating directly on a day-to-day basis with their
counterparts in other jurisdictions.45  Such  networks  are  now  commonplace  in  the
European Union, where national regulators have established formal and informal EU-
wide  networks  in  most  areas  of  policymaking, from  competition policy, financial
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services, environmental policy to utilities regulation.46  By the turn of the century, Anne-
Marie Slaughter argued, national regulators had emerged as “the new diplomats,”
bypassing traditional foreign-ministry channels to cooperate in a “fast, flexible, and
efficient” manner with their counterparts.47  Significantly, we and other scholars have
pointed to the transatlantic relationship, and in particular to the 1995 New Transatlantic
Agenda and the 1998 Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP), as an emerging arena
for such regulatory networks, with US and EU regulators interacting directly and
fruitfully in areas such as competition policy and data privacy protection.48
Some  scholars  went  even  further,  maintaining  that  these  emerging
transgovernmental  networks  could  provide  the  setting  for  a  sort  of  international
deliberative  democracy,  in  which  national  experts  would  meet,  set  aside  their
preconceived notions about the national interest, and deliberate together in search of the
best available policy in a given issue-area.49   This emphasis on deliberation derives
largely from the work of Jürgen Habermas, whose theory of communicative action has
been adapted to the study of international relations and to the study of EU governance.50
In  Habermasian  communicative  action,  or  what  Thomas  Risse  calls  the  “logic  of
arguing,” political actors do not simply bargain based on fixed preferences and relative
power; they may also “argue,” questioning their own beliefs and preferences, and being
open to persuasion and the power of the better argument.51
Habermas and his followers concede that genuine communicative action, or
argumentative rationality, is something of a hothouse flower, likely to flourish only under
a fairly restrictive set of conditions.  In international politics, Risse argues, deliberation,
or a logic of arguing, are most likely under the following conditions:
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•  The existence of a common lifeworld provided by a high degree of international
institutionalization in the respective issue-area….[or through] conscious efforts by
actors to construct such a common lifeworld through narratives that enable them
to communicate in a meaningful way.
•  Uncertainty of interests and/or lack of knowledge about the situation among the
actors.
•  International  institutions  based  on  nonhierarchical  relations  enabling  dense
interactions in informal, network-like settings.52
These conditions are by no means satisfied everywhere in international politics; but
where they are present, Habermasian scholars predict that international actors will engage
in arguing rather than bargaining, presenting their arguments in a common language, such
as those of law or science, and proceeding to decisions on the basis of “the better
argument” rather than the bargaining power of the respective actors.   And indeed, a
growing number of studies have pointed to at least suggestive evidence of deliberation
within  EU  regulatory  networks,  including  the  EU’s  Committee  of  Permanent
Representatives53,  comitology  committees,54  and  the  OMC,55  as  well  as
internationally.56
Faced  with  a  situation  of  growing  economic  interdependence,  US  and  EU
policymakers in the 1990s onwards engaged in extensive efforts at bilateral cooperation,
enlisting  networks  of  scientists,  civil-society  groups,  business  representative,  and
especially government regulators from both sides to exchange views in the hope of
fostering better understanding of each other’s regulatory approaches.  In this context, they
identified biotechnology as an area in which structured dialogues might build mutual
understanding and trust, provide early warning of disputes, and perhaps contribute to a
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gradual convergence of regulatory approaches to GMO foods and crops.57  Starting in the
1990s, the US and the EU established a series of working groups on GM foods and crops,
bringing together government regulators, scientists, and representatives from business
and civil-society groups, in order to deliberate, separately and together, and possibly find
common ground.
As we shall see in Chapter 3, however, these groups generally did not produce the
level of deliberation desired, or at least any deliberation that has so far had any significant
impact on the ongoing transatlantic GMO conflict.   US and EU regulators did meet
regularly and exchange information and views during the 1990s, but they also brought to
the table, and sought to defend, starkly different regulatory approaches, and none of these
groups was able to reach agreement on practical cooperation in the approval of GM foods
and crops, much less on harmonized regulations.  Just as importantly, even if regulators
from the two sides had been able to bridge their differences and move towards a common
approach, both sides found themselves operating in a highly politicized issue-area
characterized by strongly mobilized interest groups and by a volatile public opinion that
made it difficult, if not impossible, to engage in any substantive compromise.
1.4 The Move to International Institutions.
The regulation of agricultural biotechnology did not, in any event, remain simply
a bilateral issue. By the late 1990s, other countries were adopting their own regulatory
approaches to GM foods and crops. The choices made by those countries, and by the
various international regimes whose competences touched in one way or another on the
issue of agricultural biotechnology, could bolster or undermine US and European
positions, and both sides therefore sought to advance their interests through a variety of
multilateral regimes such as the World Trade Organization and its Agreement on Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), which addresses trade-related aspects of
GM foods and crops; the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol, signed in 2000 as an amendment
to the UN Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), which deals with the environmental
implications of GMOs; the OECD which examines cross-cutting trade, regulatory, and
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technological issues; and the Codex Alimentarius Commission which sets “voluntary”
food-safety standards for conventional as well as genetically modified foods.
For decades, regime theorists have argued that multilateral regimes could help
states to cooperate, by reducing the transaction costs of negotiations, by facilitating
deliberative decision-making among states, and by monitoring and facilitating state
compliance and implementation of agreed rules, standards and principles.   Consistent
with the basic tenets of regime theory, the US, the EU, and other countries have
undertaken negotiations on many aspects of agricultural biotechnology regulation.  Once
again, however, successful cooperation – and in particular a resolution of the fundamental
transatlantic dispute – has proven elusive, for two reasons.  First, many issue-areas in
international politics are characterized by stark disputes about the distribution of costs
and benefits from cooperation.58   While all parties to a regime may agree about the
desirability  of  cooperation,  they  may  and  often  do  disagree  about  the  terms of
cooperation, which result in unequal benefits and costs for the parties.   International
regimes may contribute to cooperative outcomes in these situations by facilitating
negotiations and establishing common rules, but the presence of distributive conflicts is
likely  to  impede  deliberation  and  foster  hardball  bargaining,  in  which  each  side
maneuvers to press for an agreement closest to its own preferences.
In the case of agricultural biotechnology, we argue, the United States, the
European Union and other countries share a common interest in avoiding a global trade
war, but they differ sharply in their preferred solutions.  For this reason, within each of
the various multilateral fora that we examine in Chapter 4, the United States has sought to
promote what it terms its more “science-based” approach to biotechnology regulation,
while the European Union has sought to secure international recognition for its more
precautionary approach.  Here again, evidence of genuine deliberation is hard to find, in
particular where issues ranged beyond the conduct of scientific risk assessments to actual
risk regulation policy. The result thus far in each of these regimes has been, for the most
part, a series of inelegant and often vague compromises, with no clear victory for either
side and with little or no evidence of a convergence of views about the fundamental
issues.
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A second, related impediment to cooperation has to do with the inherently cross-
sectoral nature of agricultural biotechnology, which implicates numerous ministries and
agencies  within  government,  which  in  turn  represent  governments  in  different
multilateral regimes in diverse areas such as trade (WTO), the environment (CBD), food
safety standards (Codex), and those of a cross-cutting nature (OECD).  Within such a
“regime complex” in which different institutions offer different opportunities for strategic
actors, states frequently engage in “forum shopping,” favoring the specific regime or
forum most likely to produce their preferred outcomes.59   The existence of multiple,
overlapping regimes with no clear hierarchy among them, moreover, tends to produce
legal inconsistencies among regimes reflective of underlying differences among powerful
actors, further clouding the prospects for successful cooperation.
This is indeed the pattern we find in the case of agricultural biotechnology. Both
the  United  States  and  European  Union  attempted  to  promulgate  universal  global
standards for agricultural biotechnology that reflected their own. The US stressed
“science-based”  risk  determinations,  while  the  EU  promulgated  a  precautionary
approach. They both tried to globalize their own localisms. We find that the United States
demonstrates a clear preference for the WTO forum, with its emphasis on trade and its
disciplines on the use of non-tariff barriers to trade, while the European Union has shown
a preference for the CBD and the Biosafety Protocol, with its greater emphasis on
environmental impacts and on the importance of precaution.  We also find substantial,
and as-yet unresolved, inconsistencies among the various fragmented regimes, which
place variable emphasis on the importance of free trade and of environmental protection,
with no overarching hierarchy to resolve conflicts among them.  For these reasons, none
of the various multilateral regimes has yet resolved the fundamental differences between
the US and the EU over the regulation of GMOs, which remains fundamentally contested
after a decade of multilateral negotiations.
Indeed, one of our novel findings is that the inconsistencies and conflicts among
regimes have influenced the nature of the regimes themselves, including the long-
standing distinction between “hard” or binding law on the one hand, and “soft” or non-
binding law on the other.  As we shall see, the reputedly “hard” rules of the WTO have
                                                            
59 On regime complexes, see Raustiala and Victor 2004; on forum-shopping, see Jupille and Snidal 2005.37
been “softened” to accommodate environmental and health concerns, such as those
reflected in the Biosafety Protocol and debates within Codex. The so-called “soft” law
mechanisms within Codex, by contrast, have been stalemated or “hardened” whenever
matters could have a possible bearing on WTO dispute settlement, as states have sent
trade delegates along with food safety technical experts to discuss the adoption of new
“voluntary” standards and principles.
1.4    US and EU Regulatory Developments Since 2000:  Continuity, Change, and
(Lack of) Convergence
Many analysts have expressed hopes that the US and EU regulatory systems
might converge, relieving the friction between them, either through joint deliberation or
as a result of pressures exerted by international organizations like the WTO, by national
and transnational interest groups and public opinion, or by market forces.   Many
American observers, for example, hoped that the EU, under pressure from the World
Trade Organization, might move towards what the US calls a more “science-based” and
less “politicized” system of regulation, which would, in turn, facilitate the resumption of
approvals for new GM varieties.   Many European observers, by contrast, hoped that
either public opinion or market pressures would prompt a process of “trading up” in the
United States, which might become more precautionary in its own regulations and thus
more accommodating of European regulatory choices.
In Chapter 5, we review the impact of transnational political, legal, social and
market pressures on EU and US policies toward agricultural biotechnology. We identify
the direction and the sources of change and assess the evidence for convergence between
the two systems.    In the European Union, the period since 2000 has witnessed a root-
and-branch reform of the regulatory system for agricultural biotechnology, as the
European Commission has sought to reassure the public about the completeness and the
rigor of the EU regulatory system, and thereafter resume the stalled approval process for
new GM foods and crops. Beginning with the publication of a White Paper on Food
Safety  in  2000,  the  Commission  has  proposed,  and  the  Council  of  Ministers  and
European Parliament have adopted, a raft of new legislation regulating every aspect of
GM  food  production  “from  farm  to  fork.”   Among  other  measures,  the  EU  has38
strengthened the original 1990 directive on the release of GMOs into the environment,
extending the scope of the regulation to include GM feed as well as products derived
from, but no longer containing, GMOs.   In addition, the Union has adopted binding
legislation providing for mandatory labeling and traceability of all GM foods and crops,
as well as a recommendation on the co-existence of GM and conventional crops, and new
rules on the approval and cataloguing of GM seeds.   The Union’s new legislative
framework incorporates some elements of US practice and of WTO jurisprudence. Most
notably, it requires scientific risk assessment of each GM variety by a newly created
independent agency – the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). The adoption of this
strict and comprehensive regulatory framework was aimed, in part, at reassuring the
European public about the adequacy of regulatory controls and hence at ending a six-year
moratorium on the approval of new GM varieties in the Council of Ministers, which was
one of the targets of the US legal complaint before the WTO.  The de facto moratorium
did indeed end in May 2004 with the approval by the Commission of a new variety of
GM maize.
However, the controversy over GM foods and crops shows no signs of abating in
the EU.  Public opposition to GMOs remains high throughout Europe (including in the 10
new member states that joined the Union in 2004). This opposition has been reflected in
the Council of Ministers, which has consistently deadlocked on the approval of new GM
foods, leaving the final decision to the unelected European Commission.  Although the
Commission, for its part, has wanted since 2004 to overturn a series of national bans on
specific GM varieties, which the EU’s own scientists have argued are not supported by
scientific evidence, the Commission’s efforts have been rebuffed by the Council, which
voted by an overwhelming majority in June 2005 to retain the existing national bans, and
which again blocked the initiation of a legal challenge by the Commission in 2007.
Moreover, other aspects of the new legislative framework, such as the new labeling and
traceability provisions, represent a move further away from the more accommodating US
model, so that US soybean trade associations, in particular, feel that the EU system is
actually getting worse.  Even though the EU has developed a complex framework for the
approval of GM crops and foods, whether they will be approved and, in light of the new
labeling and traceability requirements, actually marketed, remains in doubt.39
For these reasons, we conclude that the EU regulatory system, despite its many
modifications over the past half-decade, remains, as it has been, a strict and highly
precautionary system. It continues to regulate GM foods and crops stringently on account
of the process of their production (their use of genetic engineering), rather than the
characteristics of the product. More importantly, in practice, it continues to impede the
commercialization in Europe, as well as around the world because of the importance of
the EU market for foreign farmers and the overall normative influence of the EU in
global politics.60 In sum, we argue that while the EU regulatory system has been
overhauled, EU policies and the practices remain similar in their effects. In this sense, the
EU’s increasingly complex, Byzantine system for authorizations and marketing of GM
varieties, incorporating multiple governmental actors and non-government stakeholders,
can be viewed as a Potemkin village. We call this reform without change.
In the United States, meanwhile, national regulators had adopted a more flexible,
product-oriented regulatory system, while biotechnology companies and farmers had
embraced GM foods and crops far more readily than in Europe.  By the end of the 1990s,
the US faced some pressures for change, leading some scholars to speculate that the
United  States  might  “trade  up”  to  the  precautionary  and  process-based  European
approach.61   These pressures took the form of three inter-related phenomena:   (1)
commercial adaptation, which occurs when US firms or farmers voluntarily comply with
EU standards in order to gain access to the EU market (e.g., growing only EU-approved
GM varieties); (2) political mobilization, which occurs when domestic US interest
groups,  spurred  (at  least  in  part)  by  events  in  Europe,  mobilize  for  stricter  GM
regulations;  and  (3)  policy  change,  when  US  authorities  adopt  stricter  domestic
regulations, whether to protect Americans from risks or to reassure foreign markets and
foreign governments of the safety of US products.62   A careful analysis of recent US
events provides some evidence of commercial adaptation and political mobilization, as
well as some modest policy change. However, these policy changes largely reflect an
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incremental elaboration of the traditional US system rather than any regulatory overhaul
in the direction of the EU’s approach.
With regard to commercial adaptation, US farmers and growers’ associations
have based their decisions on which crops to plant at least in part on the regulatory
standards of the EU and other important markets such as Japan and Canada.   Many
farmers, for example, have concentrated production of corn and soybeans in those GM
varieties that have been approved for marketing in the EU, and concern about the
reception of GM crops in Europe has also led the leading agricultural biotechnology
company, Monsanto, to defer marketing of its genetically modified “Roundup Ready”
wheat.  We also find some evidence of US farmers avoiding even the use of EU-approved
GM crops, in order to appeal to the EU market for GM-free foods and avoid having to
comply with the EU’s increasingly strict labeling and traceability requirements. The
commercial prospects for new GM foods and crops in the United States, therefore,
remain unclear.  On the one hand, US farmers have showed little inclination to abandon
established GM varieties, such as soybeans, cotton and corn, use of which continues to
grow in the United States.  On the other hand, GM production in the United States has
increasingly concentrated on these three crops, while notification of new varieties and
commercial acceptance of other GM crops has decreased from the rapid pace of the late
1990s.
With regard to political mobilization, the evidence suggests that media coverage
of the US/EU dispute, together with certain domestic scandals such as the 2000 Starlink
controversy (in which a GM corn approved only for animal feed was found in corn chips
and other food products), provided opportunities for US consumer and environmental
groups to mobilize in opposition to GM foods and crops.  This mobilization has so far
been unsuccessful in the US (unlike in Europe), and there is little evidence that US public
opinion shares the deep distrust toward GMOs felt by European publics.   Polls show
relatively high levels of trust in federal regulators such as the FDA and little support
(much less intensive political pressure) for stricter regulation of GM foods in the United
States.
At the level of federal regulation, there have been debates among US legislators
and regulators about possible reforms of the US regulatory process, but the US Congress41
has not produced any significant changes to the statutory basis for US biotechnology
regulation.   In  the  absence  of  legislative  action,  the  most  important  regulatory
developments have come from government regulators such as the FDA, which conducted
various hearings and studies to consider administrative changes to the existing regulatory
system, including the possibility of introducing mandatory labeling or pre-market
approvals of new GM varieties.  These hearings led the FDA to make some changes to its
procedures, including the issuing of guidelines for companies to undertake voluntary
notification to the FDA of new GM foods, as well as guidelines for companies wishing to
voluntarily label their products as having been made with, or without, the use of
bioengineering.  Nevertheless, the agency declined to follow the EU practice of requiring
mandatory prior approval of all GM foods and crops, nor did it endorse mandatory
provisions for the labeling and traceability of GMOs.   Reform of the US regulatory
system remains on the US agenda, with the USDA having announced a review of its own
regulatory procedures, but such reforms are likely to be piecemeal and relatively modest
in comparison with Europe’s regulatory requirements. Overall, US use of GM soybeans,
cotton and corn continues to rise. While in the EU, we found there has been much reform
with little or no fundamental change, in the US we find change without reform of the
regulatory framework.
In both cases, moreover, we find striking evidence of increasing returns, inertia,
and path-dependent development. In the US case, the early adoption of a welcoming
regulatory framework in the 1980s contributed to the growth of a strong biotech industry
and the widespread acceptance of GMOs among farmers and (to a lesser extent) public
opinion, creating a powerful constituency for the new technology from below.  At the
same time, US institutional rules privilege the status quo, in which GMOs continue to be
regulated under the two-decades-old Coordinated Framework, which has changed only at
the margins in the absence of significant new Congressional legislation.  In the EU case,
by contrast, the early adoption of a highly restrictive regulatory framework, together with
the food-safety crises of the mid-1990s, discouraged farmers from planting GM crops,
prompted retailers to resist selling GM foods, and led to a flight of biotech investment
from Europe, all of which undermined political support for GM foods and crops.
Furthermore, the EU’s supermajoritarian legislative rules, requiring a qualified majority42
among disparate states in the Council of Ministers as well as a majority in the European
Parliament, has created a huge institutional hurdle to any fundamental reform of the EU
regulatory framework.
The story of GM crops and foods is an ongoing one, and there could be more
convergence in the future in response to increasing understanding by regulators of the
risks of GM foods and crops, or to exogenous shocks such as a future food safety or
environmental crisis. We conclude that indeed, the period since 2000 has seen changes in
US and European regulatory procedures and market behavior.   Some elements of these
changes can be interpreted as responses to external pressures, and as modest steps by
each side toward some move that accommodates the other.  Yet despite these changes, we
find at best limited evidence of fundamental convergence between the two systems.  The
contemporary EU regulatory system continues to regulate strictly GM foods and crops on
account  of  the  process  by  which  they  were  produced,  rather  than  the  product
characteristics, and allows regulatory decisions to be based on “other legitimate factors”
besides scientific risk assessments, both elements that distinguish it sharply from the US
system.   The  US  regulatory  system,  for  its  part,  remains  one  in  which  relatively
independent  federal  agencies  regulate  GM  foods  and  crops  according  to  the
characteristics of the product rather than the process of genetic modification, with no
requirement for pre-market authorization of new GM varieties and no mandatory rules for
traceability or labeling of GM foods and crops.   Notwithstanding around a decade of
negotiations,  deliberations,  and  disputes,  the  differences  between  the  US  and  EU
regulatory systems have proven to be robust and enduring. The main effect of the EU
system within the US has not been a regulatory one, but rather been on decisions by US
farmers not to adopt new GM varieties, such as for wheat and rice, even where they have
US  regulatory  authorization.  The  pressure  for  the  US  to  do  something  about
extraterritorial market effects of the EU system correspondingly rose.
1.5  The Peril, and Promise, of WTO Adjudication
Transatlantic tensions over the regulation of GM foods and crops built steadily
over the course of the late 1990s and into the following decade, yet for much of this
period,  the  United  States  chose  not  to  avail  itself  of  options  within  its  preferred43
international forum, the WTO.   During this period, the US government came under
increasing pressure from agricultural producers to bring a case before the WTO’s Dispute
Settlement Body.  US biotech firms joined agricultural associations in arguing that the
EU’s strict regulation of GMOs, and in particular its unofficial moratorium on the
approval of new GM varieties, damaged US interests and violated the provisions of WTO
law.  Despite these pressures, the Clinton administration, and for a time the George W.
Bush administration, resisted the temptation to bring a legal complaint against the EU at
the WTO.   Notwithstanding its considerable sympathy with the complaints of US
producers, both US administrations feared that a WTO case could be counter-productive,
increasing European resistance to GMOs being “forced” on consumers by the WTO, and
possibly  exporting  European  concerns  about  GM  foods  and  crops  to  American
consumers.  The mass demonstrations at the 1999 WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle
magnified these concerns, showing the extent of popular opposition to the WTO among
activist environmental and other groups. Following Seattle, US officials were wary that
such a complaint – whatever the outcome – could undermine support not only for GM
foods and crops, but for the WTO regime itself and, in particular, the prospect of a new
round of trade negotiations that were to have been launched in Seattle.
In May of 2003, however, the Bush Administration’s forbearance gave way for a
number of reasons, and the United States, joined by Canada and Argentina, brought a
WTO  complaint  against  the  European  Union,  alleging  that  the  Union’s  de  facto
moratorium on new approvals, as well as the national bans on approved varieties,
constituted a violation of the SPS Agreement.   In Chapter 6, we examine the reasons for
the US decision to bring a complaint before the WTO, analyze the legal issues raised in
the US complaint, and weigh the possibility that the case, despite its obvious risks, might
have a beneficial impact by clarifying the parties’ legal obligations under WTO law,
stabilizing the conflict, and encouraging greater transparency and accommodation in GM
regulation on both sides of the Atlantic. In short, we analyze the potential role of
international legal processes, and especially third-party dispute resolution, in resolving
intractable regulatory disputes.
By 2003, we argue, the Bush administration had come to believe that the costs of
bringing a WTO case (backlash against GMOs in Europe, spread of the anti-GMO44
movement to the US) had partially abated, while the global stakes of the debate, and thus
the potential benefits of a WTO case, had substantially increased.  During this period a
number of advanced industrialized countries had followed the EU’s lead in requiring
special approval and labeling procedures for GM foods and crops, while some less
developed countries in Africa had gone so far as to reject the provision of GM corn
offered as food aid.  If the US failed to act promptly, Bush administration officials feared,
these policies could become entrenched beyond Europe, and difficult to change later. At
the same time, however, the number of countries growing significant acreage of GM
crops had grown to include major agricultural producers such as Argentina, Brazil,
Canada, China and India, and, though to a much less extent, even Spain and Germany
within the EU (see Table 6).  In this context, the United States had a strong incentive to
try to arrest the spread of the EU’s precautionary approach, as well as a growing number
of allies that shared Europe’s views.
Significantly, the United States and other complainants did not challenge the EU’s
legislative framework for GM approvals as such, nor did it challenge (despite loud
complaints from producers) the EU’s more recently adopted labeling and traceability
provisions.   Instead,  the  complaints  focused  on  the  EU’s  implementation  of  that
regulatory framework, challenging three specific EU actions: (1) the EU’s de facto
“general moratorium” on new approvals; (2) “product-specific moratoria,” or failure to
approve particular GM varieties found to be safe by EU scientists; and (3) the persistent
use of “safeguard provisions” by individual EU member states to ban GM varieties that,
once again, had been approved as safe by the Union’s own scientific experts.  In all three
cases, the complainants argued, the Union had failed to base its regulatory decisions on
scientific risk assessments as required under Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement, and those
decisions were therefore inconsistent with EU obligations under WTO law.  The EU, by
contrast, denied the existence of any moratorium, noting that new approvals were
pending the completion of the EU’s regulatory framework, and argued further that the
SPS Agreement did not apply to the regulation of GMOs, which was concerned primarily
with the protection of the environment and therefore fell under the rubric of the EU’s
preferred forum, the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol.
In September 2006, the WTO dispute-settlement panel issued its decision, which45
was over one thousand pages in text. The panel expressly avoided deciding (or in its
words, “examining”) many crucial issues, and most particularly the question “whether
biotech products in general are safe or not” and “whether the biotech products at issue in
this dispute are ‘like’ their conventional counterparts.” The panel found in favor of the
United States, but largely on procedural and not substantive grounds. It found only that
the EU engaged in “undue delay” in its approval process in violation of Article 8 and
Annex C of the SPS Agreement, and in this way, avoided determining whether the EU
had based a decision on a risk assessment or whether the assessments showed actual risks
or greater risks than for conventional plant varieties. By deciding that the EU had not yet
taken an “SPS measure,” the panel, which took almost three years to issue a decision (in a
process that was not to exceed nine months), further delayed having to make any
substantive determination itself. Regarding safeguards enacted by EU member state
safeguards, in contrast, the panel found that all of them were SPS “measures” that
violated the EU’s substantive obligations under article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement because
they were “not based on a risk assessment.” It noted in particular that the EU’s “relevant
scientific committees had evaluated the potential risks… and had provided a positive
opinion.” Thus, while the panel refrained from making a substantive determination on
decisions at the EU level, it expressly found that the member state bans were inconsistent
with the EU’s substantive WTO commitments. Since the European Commission already
was opposed to such member state safeguards and member state delay in the approval
process, the WTO panel decision effectively reconfirmed the Commission’s position in
intra-EU  politics,  and  thereby  potentially  could  lead  to  greater  transatlantic
accommodation.
In  Chapter  6,  we  assess  how  the  evident  risks  of  politicization  and/or
noncompliance with WTO “judicial” decisions have to be weighed against the potential
benefits of legal clarification and potential accommodation that such a decision can bring.
The WTO judicial system, while striving toward objectivity in its rulings and deploying
highly legalistic analysis, is necessarily concerned with the acceptance of its decisions by
WTO members and with compliance by the parties to a dispute. Even before the panel’s
GMO decision, the jurisprudence of the Appellate Body has indicated a willingness to
provide significant discretion to domestic regulators in determining the appropriate level46
of risk for the members of their society.  For this reason, we argue, the WTO dispute
settlement panel has left discretion to the EU in determining the level of acceptable risk,
while spelling out the procedural decision-making requirements that it must meet before
implementing trade-restrictive measures on GM foods and crops.
More generally, we suggest, the WTO judicial process, while undertaken by
unelected officials operating far from the purview of ordinary citizens, may nevertheless
play a positive role in helping to correct the narrow parochialism of national decision-
making.   WTO decisions, while frequently controversial and contested, have already
pressed national decision-makers to make decisions that better take account of the
impacts on foreigners while still meeting their regulatory objectives, and to justify those
decisions in a transparent manner, knowing that they are potentially subject to scrutiny
and review before the WTO dispute settlement system.  We do not advocate that WTO
panels impose their substantive regulatory preferences on member countries, but we do
suggest that the WTO can hold its member states to a procedural standard whereby all
members must rationally justify their decisions, take into account the impact of their
decisions on outsiders, and regulate in a transparent fashion.   Put differently, WTO
rulings  are  unlikely  explicitly  to  require  substantive  convergence  of  US  and  EU
approaches to risk regulation (and so far, have not done so), but they may spell out the
minimum obligations that states have towards each other when seeking to protect their
own societies from the various risks of modern life. In doing so, they can lead to greater
accommodation of divergent regulatory systems in at least two ways. First, procedural
obligations based on the use of public reason, building from scientific risk assessments,
can empower certain actors in domestic processes that lead to different substantive
decisions on particular matters. Second, where challenged regulatory decisions are held
to have met the procedural requirements and are thus found to be consistent with WTO
obligations, then the WTO legal process may lead to greater acceptance of the foreign
decision by the other side. In both ways, the WTO dispute settlement system can
facilitate accommodation of divergent regulatory decisions. Nonetheless, as we will see,
where social and regulatory approaches to technology and its risks are deeply engrained,
the impact of the WTO or any other international or transnational body on substantive
regulatory convergence, at least in the shorter term, is significantly constrained.47
During this study an important new factor arose—the emerging role of large
developing countries in the struggle over genetically modified crops. China and India are
rapidly adopting GM cotton for textiles. Brazil and Argentina have adapted GM soy.
With the rise of these countries as players in the world economy and in its governance,
other developing countries may look to them when making their own choices over GM
varieties. We therefore conclude the book, in Chapter 7, by reviewing our overall
findings, assessing the implications of our findings for the study of international law and
politics, and examining how the US/EU dispute has affected developing countries, and
arguing that the future of agricultural biotechnology will rest, at least in part, on the
decisions and the actions of less developed countries in a dispute that is no longer purely
transatlantic but increasingly global in scope.